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ABSTRACT 
We examine Coasian bargaining under uncertain payoff streams. Subjects bargained over 
both an ex ante lottery and the ex post reward. The results indicate nearly 87 percent of all 
agreements were Pareto efficient. However, only 7.3 percent were mutually advantageous, while 
nearly 85 percent of all agreements split the reward equally. Consequently, we remain cautious 
about policy recommendations based on the Coase theorem where uncertain payoffs exist. 
Finally, we find no evidence supporting the proposition that a fundamental difference exists 
between bargaining behavior over the ex ante lottery and the ex post rewards of an uncertain 
event. 
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1. Introduction 
Coase (1960) envisioned a world in which two self-interested parties will bargain to a 
mutually advantageous, Pareto-optimal level of an externality regardless of initial unilateral 
property right entitlements. The power of Coase's world rests in the decentralized attainment of 
efficient resource allocation even in the presence of market failure. The potential policy 
implications of the so-called Coase theorem are enormous. If the Coase theorem is robust, then 
the role of a third party (e.g., the state) is reduced to simply assigning unambiguous unilateral 
property rights which facilitate private bargaining and economic efficiency. 
Beginning with Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) and Prudencio (1982), several experimental 
studies have argued that the Coase theorem is quite robust. 1 In general, the studies have 
supported the two key behavioral outcomes implied by Coasian bargaining: (i) two parties will 
agree on a Pareto-optimal level of an externality, and (ii) the agreement will be obtained through 
mutually advantageous bargaining between two parties. As Harrison et al. (1987) note the Coase 
theorem is "behaviorally 'alive and well' in relatively sterile and abstract bargaining 
environments." 
The experimental studies have been reluctant, however, in proposing policies for the 
naturally occurring environment. A major reason is most monetary payoffs (profits or damages) 
in the natural environment involve some degree of uncertainty.' In contrast, Coase experiments 
have been designed such that payoffs are known with complete certainty. The two parties 
bargain over the selection and distribution of a deterministic payoff stream.' Consequently, both 
Hoffman and Spitzer (1985b) and Harrison et al. (1987) warn against overextending the robust 
experimental results to environments where payoffs are uncertain' 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the robustness of Coasian bargaining under 
uncertainty. We consider whether individuals behave differently when bargaining over the two 
key elements that define an uncertain event: the lottery representing the likelihood the event will 
occur and the reward received if the event does occur. To examine this issue, we construct two 
distinct bargaining sessions: ex ante lottery bargaining and ex post reward bargaining. Ex ante 
lottery bargaining exists when two parties bargain over the distribution of lottery tickets that 
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determine the likelihood of winning a fixed reward. Ex post reward bargaining exists when two 
parties bargain over the distribution of the resulting reward given a fixed lottery schedule. 
Both bargaining sessions use simple and compound lottery games. A simple binary lottery 
game is a one-stage lottery where the winner of a deterministic monetary reward is uncertain. A 
compound binary lottery game is a two-stage lottery where both the winner and the amount of 
the reward is uncertain. The simple and compound lotteries are used to capture bargaining 
behavior under differing degrees of uncertainty. 
The experimental results answer the following four questions: (!) Does Coasian bargaining 
remain Pareto-optimal under uncertainty? Yes, Coasian bargaining remains highly efficient even 
under uncertain payoff streams. With 86.6 percent of all bargaining agreements achieving the 
joint maximum payoffs, our evidence provides further support for the weak behavioral form of 
the Coase Theorem. 
(2) Does Coasian bargaining remain mutually advantageous under uncertainty? No, under 
uncertainty the bargainers tended to pool risk rather than seek mutually advantageous outcomes. 
Nearly 84.2 percent of all agreements essentially agreed to pool the risk and equally split the 
payoff or chances to win the reward even though this implied a disadvantageous bargain to the 
controller relative to the expected payoff without a bargain.' Note that to examine mutually 
advantageous bargaining we tested the assumption that the reduction in returns obtained by the 
controller was not simply a "mutually advantageous" tradeoff for greater certainty by explicitly 
monitoring the risk preferences of the subjects. Consequently, our evidence does not support the 
strong behavioral form of the Coase Theorem. 
Bargainers acting more like "fairmen" than "gamesmen" is supported by recent 
experimentation on Nash-axiomatic models and Rubinstein-strategic models of bargaining [see 
Roth (1988) and Thaler (1988b)]. As Thaler (l988b) notes one conclusion which emerges is that 
non-monetary arguments such as fairness can play a significant role in determining the outcome 
of bargaining. Individuals will walk away from profitable outcomes if offered insultingly low 
rewards. Alternately, as argued in Shogren (1989), the equal splits may be due to a lack of well-
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defined loyalties between bargainers. When loyalties are well defined in a team style experiment, 
then bargainers achieve mutually advantageous splits in nearly 86 percent of the bargains. 
(3) Is· there a significant behavioral difference in Coasian bargaining over ex ante lotteries and 
ex post rewards? No, given our sample there was no significant statistical difference in 
bargaining over ex ante lotteries and ex post rewards. This holds for both behavioral outcomes of 
Pareto efficiency and equal split of rewards and lottery tickets. The result sharply contrasts 
individual behavior when valuing reduced risk in experimental asset markets [Shogren (1990)]. 
Individuals valued a change in lotteries significantly more than a change in rewards. Our Coasian 
bargain experiment suggests that a fundamental difference might not exist in individual behavior 
toward the lottery and the reward of an uncertain event. Alternatively, the experimental 
institution may well influence individual preferences over outcomes relative to preferences over 
lotteries over outcomes. Therefore, observed differences may be institution-specific. 
( 4) Does increased uncertainty affect the robustness of Coasian bargaining agreements? No, 
there was no significant statistical difference in bargaining over the simple lottery and the 
compound lottery. Again this holds for both behavioral outcomes of Pareto efficiency and the 
equal splitting of rewards and lottery tickets. Individuals pooled risk similarly for both the 
simple and compound lottery. Greater uncertainty did not create basic differences in bargaining 
behavior over lotteries and rewards. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the binary lottery games used for the 
experiment. Section 3 describes the experimental design, and Section 4 presents the results. The 
conclusions are discussed in Section 5. 
2. Coasian Bargaining and Binary Lottery Games 
In general, a Coase experiment must satisfy Hoffman and Spitzer's ( 1982) well-defined set 
of assumptions: (a) two parties to each bargain, (b) perfect knowledge of one another's utility 
functions, (c) perfectly competitive markets, (d) zero transactions costs, (e) costless court system, 
(f) profit-expected utility-maximizing consumers, (g) no wealth effects, and (h) parties will strike 
mutually advantageous bargains in the absence of transactions costs. Given assumptions (a) 
through (g), assumption (h) creates two testable behavior outcomes of Coasian bargaining: 
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Pareto-optimal agreements between two parties and the agreements are mutually advantageous. 
We focus on these two outcomes in testing Coasian bargaining under uncertainty. 
Following Roth and Malouf (1979), we construct a binary lottery to control for risk 
preference. First, consider the ex ante bargaining session where two parties bargain over the 
distribution of lottery tickets. Let L = [pR;(l-p)r] be the simple lottery where party A has 
probability p and (1-p) [0 5 p 5 I] of winning R orr, R > r. After normalizing each party's 
utility, U(R) = I and U(r) = 0, party A's expected utility equals p [Roth (1987)]. Party B's 
expected utility equals (1-p) for a Pareto efficient bargain or (I - p- Q) otherwise, where Q is 
probability neither party wins.' 
The compound lottery adds a second stage where now A's expected utility equals pq, where 
q is the probability of winning second stage. Party B's expected utility equals (1-p)q for a Pareto 
efficient bargain or (1-p-Q)q otherwise. The compound lottery is used to examine bargaining 
behavior under increased uncertainty. As is evidenced by the so-called "Winner's Curse", not all 
winners of lotteries or auctions are guaranteed a large reward.' Often the winner of a lottery will 
find the realized reward substantially less than expected. The compound lottery captures the 
increased uncertainty but still allows the party's utility to be determined. Finally, the 
disagreement reward D equals r, thereby providing no incentive for one risk averse party to hold 
out for D. 
In the ex post bargaining session, two parties bargain over the distribution of the large 
reward. For example, party A might agree to receive 40 percent of the large reward if either 
party A or B wins. Let Z (r 5 Z 5 R) be the amount of the reward A receives with probability 
i5 = I for a Pareto efficient bargain, i5 = p + (1-p-Q) otherwise. Party A's expected utility then is 
pU(Z) = U(L) = p. Therefore, for a Pareto-efficient outcome party A's utility from receiving Z 
equals p. Party B's utility from receiving Z equals (1-p). In this case, Z is the certainty 
equivalent of playing the lottery. To determine mutually advantageous bargaining, we explicitly 
monitor each individual's certainty equivalent for expected payoffs without bargains. We 
describe this process in the next section. 
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In the ex post compound bargaining sessions, since both parties agree to receive some Z (r 
.s. Z .s. R) with probability p' = pq + (1-p-Q)q .s. q, Party A's utility is p'U(Z) = U(L) = pq. If a 
Pareto-efficient agreement is reached, then p' = pq + (1-p-Q)q = q, and Party A's utility from 
receiving Z equals the probability of receiving the large reward p. Party B's utility of receiving 
Z when p' = q is equal to (1-p). Again, if two parties cannot come to an agreement in the 
allotted time, the disagreement reward equals the small reward, D = r. 
Given the Coasian assumptions (a)-(h) and the binary lottery games, four propositions will 
be considered to test the robustness of Coasian bargaining under uncertainty. 
Pareto-Optimum Proposition (pI): Two parties will bargain to a Pareto-optimal lottery schedule 
under uncertain monetary payoffs. 
Mutually Advantageous Proposition (P2l: Two parties will bargain to a mutually advantageous 
agreement over distribution of lottery tickets or rewards under uncertainty. 
Acceptance of propositions PI and P2 will support robust Coasian bargaining even under 
uncertainty. If PI and P2 are oot accepted, however, then the general Coase theorem is not 
universally applicable to bargaining under uncertain monetary payoffs. Since most natural 
environments involve uncertainty to some degree, nonacceptance will continue to restrict the 
applicability of Coasian bargaining to policy decisions. 
Lottery-Reward Proposition (P3l: There is no behavior difference in Coasian bargaining over ex 
ante lotteries and ex post rewards. 
Rejection of P3 will support the view that a significant difference exists in individual behavior 
toward lotteries and rewards. Shogren (1990) found evidence that individuals value changes in 
the lottery significantly higher than changes in the reward of an uncertain event. The lottery 
change was preferred to the reward change due to a certainty effect. In the lottery change, the 
individual was guaranteed a certain gain with no loss. The reward change, however, guaranteed 
no loss but did not guarantee a gain. Therefore, the lottery change was valued significantly 
higher than the reward change. 
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Given the basic structured differences in the ex ante lottery and ex post reward bargaining 
one might suspect a similar difference in behavior. The lottery bargain implies only one party 
will win the large reward, R. With the reward bargain, both parties have the potential to receive 
some payoff, Z. Although according to the Coase theorem, both bargains should be efficient and 
mutually advantageous, lottery bargaining may be more competitive. The ali-or-nothing nature 
of the lottery bargain may lead to more mutually advantageous bargains than the ex post severity 
bargains. Indeed, if this is the case, Shogren's (1990) findings are supported and a fundamental 
difference may exist in bargaining before and after uncertainty is resolved. If P3 is not rejected, 
however, then the robustness of Coasian bargaining is independent of whether parties bargain 
before or after uncertainty is resolved. 
Increased Uncertainty Proposition (P4l: There is no behavioral difference in Coasian bargaining 
in simple versus compound binary lottery games. 
Acceptance of P4 suggests the robustness of Coasian bargaining is independent of the degree of 
uncertainty. Coasian bargaining in the experiments would have a similar strength or weakness. 
If P4 is not accepted, then further experimentation is warranted to determine if a boundary exists 
of robust Coasian bargaining under uncertainty. 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
To the extent possible, the experimental design and procedures follow Hoffman and Spitzer 
(1982) and Harrison and McKee (1985). All subjects were undergraduate students at Appalachian 
State University, and were considered inexperienced bargainers, i.e., no subject had participated 
in a Coasian bargaining experiment. As the subjects entered the lab, each was randomly assigned 
to be either party A or party B. 
Each subject was given an identical set of instructions.' The subjects were told they would 
participate in two successive bargaining sessions, each session with a different opponent. 
Opponents differed to reduce sharing behavior and altruism, thereby increasing the incentive for 
mutually advantageous bargaining [see Harrison and McKee (1985)]. Each bargaining session was 
face-to-face, public, and had a ten minute time constraint. No physical threats were allowed. A 
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monitor was present for each session. The monetary payoffs were public but only after 
completion of both sessions. 
Subjects participated in either the simple or the compound lottery, not both. Regardless of 
the lottery game, each subject participated in one ex ante lottery and one ex post reward 
bargaining session. Each session had an agreement outcome and a disagreement outcome. The 
agreement outcome required agreement by the two parties on (i) which number to select from a 
lottery schedule reflecting each party's probability of winning the large reward [see Table I], and 
(ii) how to distribute lottery tickets which determine the probability of winning a reward (ex ante 
lottery) or how to distribute the reward (ex post reward). All agreement outcomes required both 
parties sign a contract stating the number selected and the distribution of lottery tickets or 
reward. The contracts were perfectly enforced by the monitor. 
If two parties could not come to an agreement in the allotted time, then the disagreement 
outcome was enforced. The disagreement outcome was consistent across bargaining sessions: If 
two parties could not come to an agreement, both parties would receive the small reward (zero) 
for that session. The zero payment disagreement outcome controlled for potential risk posturing 
by the bargainers. 
At the start of each session one party, the controller, was given unilateral property rights 
over the lottery schedule. The controller had complete control over which number was selected 
from the lottery schedule. The controller could select a number him/herself without agreement 
from the other party and inform the monitor, who would then end the session. The other party 
attempted to influence the controller to reach a mutually advantageous decision by offering to 
give part or all of his lottery tickets or realized reward to the controller. 
Following Hoffman and Spitzer's (1985b) experiments on concepts of distributive justice, 
the controller was determined on a competitive basis. Hoffman and Spitzer found a competitive 
game trigger increased the incentive for mutually advantageous bargaining. A simple random 
assignment of controller privileges (e.g., coin flip) increased the likelihood of equal distribution 
of payoffs. The goal of a competitive game trigger is to bestow the controller "moral authority" 
8 
over the other party. In our experiments, the competitive game trigger was a dot game similar in 
nature to Hoffman and Spitzer's (1985b) game.' 
After reading the instructions at least once and listening to the monitor read the 
instructions once, the subjects were given a set of questions designed to determine their 
understanding of the instructions. After the subjects correctly answered all questions and all 
relevant verbal questions were answered by the monitor, the controller was decided and the 
bargaining began. First, the subjects bargained over ex post rewards, then after switching 
bargaining partners the subjects bargained over ex ante lottery tickets. 
Consider a typical efficient bargain in a simple lottery game. Using lottery schedule X 
from Table I, the controller has the option of selecting the number which provides him an 
expected return of $8 (80 percent chance of earning $10) and the other party $0 expected return, 
or if both parties agree they could select the Pareto efficient number (#3) and divide the 100 
percent chance of earning $10. Coasian bargaining theory would predict that the parties will 
agree to the number yielding I 00 percent chance to win $10, with the controller getting no less 
than the $8 expected return. 
After both the ex ante and ex post bargaining sessions were completed, the uncertainty 
about monetary payoffs was resolved. For the simple lottery game, the winner of the ex ante 
lottery was determined by a random draw of a lottery ticket from an urn. The composition of 
tickets corresponded to the contractual agreements made between the two parties. Tl\e winner 
received the entire large reward. In the ex post session, a random draw determined the winner, 
and the reward was distributed to the parties according to the contractual agreement. 
In the compound lottery, uncertainty was resolved in two stages. First, the winner of the 
lottery was determined by random draw, then the amount of the reward, either R or r, was 
determined by a coin flip. The distribution of lottery tickets and the payoffs in the ex ante and 
ex post sessions correspond to the signed contractual agreements between the two parties. 
The Pareto efficient outcome for all ex post sessions guaranteed the subjects an agreed 
upon reward (Z) with I 00 percent certainty [see Table I]. Since a certain outcome could be 
achieved, we monitored each individual's risk preference for the lotteries where there was an 80 
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or 90 percent chance of winning the large reward. These two lotteries reflect the maximum 
expected reward attainable without bargaining for schedules X, Z, and Y [Table 1]. Risk 
preference was monitored by determining each individual's certainty equivalent for the 80 and 90 
percent lotteries [also see Murnighan et al. (1988)]. Accordingly, each subject answered two final 
questions of the form: 
I am indifferent between receiving$ __ with 100 percent certainty and playing a lottery where 
there is an 80 (90) percent chance of winning $10 and a 20 (10) percent chance of winning $0. 
By comparing the individual's certainty equivalent to the agreed upon reward (Z), we can 
determine if a mutually advantageous bargain has occurred. For example, say a controller 
bargained to a 50/50 split ($5) in the ex post session under schedule X, but revealed a certainty 
equivalent of $7 for the 80 percent lottery, since $7 exceeds $5, the controller did not bargain to 
a mutually advantageous outcome. 
4. Experimental Results 
4.1 Efficiency 
Table 2 presents the experimental results of Coasian bargaining under uncertain monetary 
payoffs. The Pareto-Optimum Proposition PI is supported: 86.6 percent (seventy-one out of 
eighty-two) of all bargains achieved a Pareto efficient agreement. This result corresponds to the 
Coasian bargaining experiments under certainty. In a series of experiments, Hoffman and Spitzer 
(1982, 1985a, 1986) found that 89.5, 91, and 93 percent of bargains were efficient, and Harrison 
and McKee (1985) found 95.1 percent of all unilateral bargains were efficient. A simple t-test of 
two population proportions cannot reject the null hypothesis that the efficiency results in our 
experiments are not statistically different from the Harrison and McKee experiment with the 
highest efficiency (95.1 percent) with 95 percent confidence (t = -1.445). Consequently, our 
results support the weak behavioral form of Coasian bargaining even under uncertain payoff 
streams. 
Consistant with previous bargaining experiments, all contracts were perfectly enforced. 
There was never any doubt the terms of the agreement would be fulfilled with 100 percent 
certainty. To determine if the high level of efficiency (87 percent) was sensitive to the 
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probability of contract enforcement, Shogren and Kask (1990) constructed an experimental design 
incorporating four cases of imperfect enforcement. The evidence suggests Pareto efficiency is 
directly related to the probability of enforcement. When the probability of enforcement was low, 
the levels of efficiency declined to a range of 8 to 71 percent. The results suggest that efficiency 
is influenced more by uncertain contractual enforcement than by uncertain payoff streams. 
Therefore, how uncertainty enters into the bargaining problem may be as important to efficiency 
as the km of uncertainty. Future work examining bargaining efficiency should explore the 
various avenues in which uncertainty can enter into bargaining situations. 
4.2 Distribution or Wealth 
The Mutually Advantageous Proposition P2 is not supported: 84.1 percent (sixty- nine out 
of eighty-two) of all bargaining agreements split the reward equally or within one dollar of the 
reward or 10 percent of the lottery tickets. Only in 7.3 percent (six out of eighty-two) of the 
agreements did the controller achieve or exceed the maximum expected reward attainable without 
bargaining. The individuals did not follow the predicted behavior of mutually advantageous 
bargaining. Consequently, the results do not support the strong behavioral form of Coasian 
bargaining under uncertain payoff streams. 10 
Note the equitable split of rewards and lottery tickets is not solely attributable to Coasian 
bargaining experiments. Recent experimental work on non-cooperative Nash bargaining has 
obtained similar results. Although Rubinstein (1982) predicts the controller will make offers 
approaching zero and the other party will accept, the evidence is quite the opposite. The other 
party is quite willing to reject profitable transactions which are perceived as insultingly small 
offers [see Binmore et al. (1988) and Roth (1988)]. Bargainers end up behaving more like 
"fairmen" than the "gamesman" theory predicts. 
Consider four explanations of nonmutually advantageous bargaining. First, the competitive 
prebargain game trigger may not have induced a true belief of ownership in the unilateral 
property right entitlement. Following Hoffman and Spitzer ( J985a), the dot game trigger was 
designed to be competitive enough to bestow the controller with a feeling of moral authority over 
his opponent. Relative to a random coin flip, Hoffman and Spitzer demonstrated a competitive 
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game trigger could successfully bring about mutually advantageous bargaining behavior. In our 
experiments, however, subjects still pooled their risks, dividing the lottery tickets or rewards 
evenly. Equal splits occurred despite the experimental instructions explicitly stating the 
controller's "moral authority" over the other bargainer. A plausible explanation is that although 
the dot game trigger is similar to Hoffman and Spitzer's trigger, subtleties exist in competitive 
triggers which are more important than previously realized. Future research could explore the 
threshold of prebargain competitiveness necessary to induce a true belief of ownership in a 
unilateral property right experiment. 
A second explanation of equal splits is suggested by Harrison and McKee (1985). They 
argue that a small social surplus could bring about equal splits. Social surplus is defined as the 
difference between the maximum joint chance to win (100 percent) and the next best alternative. 
We tested this hypothesis by comparing the wealth distribution given Schedule Z where the social 
surplus was 20 percent to Schedules X and Y with a surplus of 5 percent [see Table l]. In 
contrast to Harrison and McKee, the larger social surplus failed to induce mutually advantageous 
bargaining. Nearly 87 percent (nineteen out of twenty-two) of the bargains given Schedule Z 
were essentially equal splits compared to 83 percent (fifty out of sixty) for schedules X and Y. 
The social surplus did not seem to be the reason for the equitable distributions. Again future 
work could consider how large the surplus must be before bargainers are induced to behave as 
predicted. 
A third explanation is that non-monetary concerns such as fairness play a significant role 
in bargaining behavior [see Hoffman and Spitzer (l985a), Thaler (1988), and Roth (1988)]. 
Equitable distributions of wealth result from bargaining if the perceived benefits of fairness 
outweigh the incentive to reach the subgame perfect equilibrium predicted by theory. The idea 
of egalitarian fairness influencing bargaining is supported by the recent work by Frank (1987), 
among others, that non-monetary concerns play an important role in an individual's utility 
function. 11 Given our experimental design used face-to-face bargains, issues of fairness could 
possibly play a role in equal splits. Roth (1988) cites evidence that due to social conditioning 
there is less disagreement with face-to-face bargaining than with anonymous bargaining 
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experiments. As a result, Roth questions the appropriateness of face-to-face negotiations in 
bargaining experiments. Although face-to-face bargaining provides more avenues of 
uncontrollable communication, one still observes many inequitable distributions in face-to-face 
bargains in the natural environment. Examples range from labor contract negotiations and 
arbitrage agreements to haggling in a farmer's market over the price of corn. Face-to-face 
bargains exist in the natural environment that do not result in equitable distributions of wealth. 
Consequently, fairness may require more context to be helpful in explaining equal split 
bargaining. 
A fourth explanation, in my mind the most plausible, is the lack of an explicitly defined 
radius of loyalty. Traditional bargaining experiments, including the one herein, have not 
controlled for the loyalty of each subject. A bargainer could be loyal only to himself, or his 
fellow bargainer, or perhaps the world. Therefore, while fairness may be important, the key 
issue is to whom the bargainer is being fair. Unless the experiment controls for fairness in the 
context of loyalty, one can not be sure. Consequently, the equal split result may be due to the 
lack of a well-defined control for loyalty among bargainers. 
Shogren (1989) tested the loyalty hypothesis by explicitly controlling loyalty. The 
experiment replicated the ex ante lottery bargains except now each bargainer was part of a team 
whose goal was to maximize team wealth. Given rules similar to a team total point boxing or 
wrestling tournament, each bargainer participated in a simple and compound lottery. Given 
explicitly controlled loyalties, only II percent (nine out of eighty-four) of all bargains remained 
equal splits of wealth, while nearly 86 percent (seventy-two out of eighty-four) were mutually 
advantageous outcomes. This result is the opposite of the distribution results obtained without 
controlling for loyalty. A bargainer shifted his concept of fairness from his opponent to the 
group of individuals who were dependent on his actions. Note that this occurred even though the 
team experiments were tilted toward an equal split solution given a random controller assignment 
(i.e., coin flip) and face-to-face bargains. Note, however, that while team bargainers behave like 
gamesmen, they were also less efficient than the nonteam bargainers who achieved nearly 87 
percent Pareto efficiency. The Pareto efficient agreements declined to 64 percent (fifty-four out 
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of eighty-four) in the team experiments. The controller in the team bargain was willing to give 
up efficiency to make sure the opponent had zero chance of earning any reward. 
In summary, equitable splits of wealth and high Pareto efficiency is observed in bargains 
where loyalties are ambiguous. Given the relative homogeneity of the subject pool, these 
bargains were generally non-confrontational. The bargainers took an egalitarian or Kantian 
position where both efficiency and equity were achieved. As the reviewer pointed out, this 
should be a cause for rejoicing, rather than despair, if it could be relied upon. Perhaps, efficient 
and equitable bargaining might be observed within tight-knit collectives such as social clubs, 
families, or the beaches of France [Laffont (1975)]. Unfortunately, the team experiments with 
explicitly defined loyalties suggest such bargaining may be illusionary. Even though the subject 
pool remained relatively homogenous, the bargains now became more confrontational. Efficiency 
declined by 20 percent and equitable splits were the exception, not the rule. I suspect that if we 
can explain the threshold that separates the fairman in the individual bargains from the 
gamesman in the team bargains, we will achieve a better correspondence between observed 
behavioral and theoretical predictions. 
4.3 Lottery and Rewards 
The Lottery-Reward Proposition P3 cannot be rejected given the results reported in Table 
2. Using a Chi-square goodness-of -fit test [see Siegel (1956)] with a 90 percent confidence level, 
there is no statistical difference in bargaining over ex ante lottery and ex post rewards. Table 3 
presents the results of the statistical tests. This result holds for both the weak (Pareto efficiency) 
and the strong (mutually advantageous bargains) behavioral firms of Coasian bargaining. The 
result also holds regardless of the lottery (simple or compound) or the social surplus (Schedule X 
andY or Z). 
This result suggests no fundamental behavioral difference exists between bargaining over 
ex ante lotteries and ex post rewards. Individuals were just as likely to bargain efficiently and to 
split the lottery tickets or reward evenly. This result contrasts the theoretical arguments of Boyer 
and Dionne (1983) and the risk reduction valuation experiments of Shogren (1990). Boyer and 
Dionne ( 1983) argued that in terms of cost-effectiveness an individual would prefer a risk 
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reduction in the severity (reward) to a reduction in the probability (lottery) of an undesired 
event. In contrast, the valuation experiments indicated that individuals were willing to pay more 
to reduce the probability than the severity of an undesired event. The results of Coasian 
experiment fail to support either difference in behavior. 
The observation of behavioral differences over lotteries and rewards may be experiment-
specific; not readily transferable to a broader range of phenomena. The experimental institution 
could influence individual behavior. Preferences over outcomes and preferences over lotteries 
over outcomes could be directly influenced by the institution. In Shogren (1990), preferences 
were examined using a sealed-bid, second-price Vickrey auction repeated over twelve market 
trials. The competitive framework with repeated market exposure disciplined the subjects to 
form values rapidly. Note that the difference in behavior was found in the last trials, not in the 
initial first trial. In the first trial, values for lottery and reward changes were not significantly 
different. Given our Coase institution only considered two ten-minute bargains, subjects may 
not have had adequate exposure to learn the predicted strategy of mutually advantageous 
positions. Lack of bargaining experience has generally been the case for all Coase bargaining 
experiments. Given efficient market allocations imply repeated exposure to the market, an 
interesting extension would be to allow ten or more bargaining opportunities. One could then 
examine whether bargaining behavior remains consistent, or whether repeated trials significantly 
influences preferences. 
4.4 Degree of Uncertainty 
The Increase Uncertainty Proposition P4 cannot be rejected given the statistical tests 
reported in Table 3. There appears to be no significant statistical differences in Coasian 
bargaining as uncertainty increases. Both the bargainers in the simple and compound lottery were 
equally likely to be efficient and to pool risks to an essentially equal split of lottery tickets or 
rewards. Neither the simple nor the compound lottery was sufficient to induce a change toward 
mutually advantageous bargaining. Risk pooling behavior was equally strong in both lotteries. 
The (non)robustness of Coasian bargaining is independent of the degree of uncertainty. 
15 
5. Conclusions 
Coasian bargaining has been examined under uncertain payoff streams. Individuals 
bargained over both the ex ante lottery of winning a reward and the ex post reward itself. First, 
the experimental results reported provided mixed support for the Coase theorem. The results 
strongly support the weak behavioral form of Coasian bargaining in that nearly 87 percent of all 
agreements were Pareto efficient. The results do not support the strong behavioral form, 
however, in that only 7.3 percent of agreements were mutually advantageous. Consequently, we 
must continue to support Hoffman and Spitzer's (l985b) warning about proposing policy 
recommendations based on the Coase theorem in natural occurring environment possessing any 
degree of uncertainty regarding monetary payoffs. 
Second, the results do not support the proposition that a fundamental difference exists in 
individual behavior toward ex ante lotteries (or probabilities) and ex post rewards (or severity). 
We find no behavioral difference in bargaining. Bargaining over both ex ante lotteries and ex 
post rewards were equally likely to generate Pareto efficient and nonmutually advantageous 
agreements. 
Expanding bargaining behavior to include non-monetary aspects such as loyalty and 
fairness is open for future exploration. When Coasian bargaining was duplicated using rules 
similar to a team total point tournament, nearly 86 percent of all bargains are mutually 
advantageous. Equal splits of payoffs rarely occurred. Therefore, issues of fairness require a 
context; a bargainer can be fair to a rival party or to the team of individuals who are dependent 
on his actions. The evidence suggests loyalties lie with the team. 
In conclusion, testing the robustness of the Coase theorem under alternative scenarios is 
crucial in determining its potential usefulness in solving externality issues. This paper takes a 
step in exploring the boundaries of the Coase theorem. Uncertain payoff streams are probably 
the rule, suggesting continuing caution must remain about Coasian solutions. Future work should 
further explore the boundaries to determine the limits to which self -interested bargaining will 
lead to mutually advantageous, Pareto efficient externality levels regardless of initial property 
rights. 
16 
FOOTNOTES 
I. Other studies include Harrison and McKee (1985), Harrison et al. (1987), Hoffman and 
Spitzer (1985a, 1986), and Coursey et al. (1987). 
2. Harrison et al. ( 1986) note three other sources of bargaining breakdown not incorporated 
into Coasian bargaining experiments. First, experimental contracts are perfectly enforced. 
Breach of contract was not an option to either of the two parties. Second, negotiation (or 
transaction) costs are assumed to be zero. Third, externalities were bilateral between the 
two bargaining parties. No third party was involved in either the damages or bargaining. 
Shogren and Kask ( 1990) have examined the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on 
bargaining efficiency. 
3. Even in the private or limited information experiments of Hoffman and Spitzer (1982) the 
payoff streams were deterministic. 
4. Harrison et al. (1986) note "[o]f course, to be confident about these possibilities for 
bargaining breakdown we would have to promulgate a model involving uncertainty and 
test it. Natural environments are likely to include such uncertainties, so we again counsel 
caution in directly applying our results." 
[p. 400. Parentheses omitted]. 
5. As in Harrison and McKee (1985), we consider an "essentially equal split" as being 
agreements with an equal split or a split of+/- $1 of the reward or+/- 10 percent of the 
lottery tickets. 
6. In our experiments, the Pareto efficient outcome always implies ii = p + (1-p-Q) = I. In 
other words, there is a I 00 percent chance one of the two bargainers will win the large 
reward. This condition is not necessary, however, for Pareto efficiency. For example, it 
could be that ii = p + (1-p-Q) = .95 represents the Pareto efficient outcome (Q=.05). This 
would hold as long as 95 percent yielded the highest expected payoff for both parties. An 
interesting extension of these bargaining experiments would be to consider bargaining 
where the Pareto efficient outcome is always less than l 00 percent. Comparing those 
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results to the results herein would provide a weak test of the generality of the so-called 
"certainty effect" discussed by Kahneman and Tversky ( 1979). 
7. The "Winner's Curse" exists if a winner of a lottery or auction actually earns negative or 
less-than-expected profits when the monetary outcome of the lottery is revealed. See 
Thaler (1988a) for a discussion of the "Winner's Curse." 
8. Actual experimental instructions are available from the author upon request or can be 
found in Shogren (1988). 
9. See Nalebuff (1988) for further description of the dot game prebargain game trigger. The 
dot game is described in detail in the experiment instructions. 
10. For the 80 percent lottery, the average certainty equivalent equaled $7.70 with a range 
between $10 and $5. For the 90 percent lottery, the average certainty equivalent equaled 
$8.40 with a range between $10 and $6. 
II. Fairness in bargaining could also be considered a form of Kantian behavior where each 
bargainer acts as they want the other bargainer to act [see Laffont (1975) and Comes and 
Sandler (1984)]. The controller may have acted as how he would have wanted the other 
party to act if he had not been the controller. This again could be the fault of the game 
trigger not inducing a belief of moral authority. 
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Table 1 
Alternative Lottery Schedules 
A's Chance B's Chance Joint 
Schedule Number to Win (%) to Win (%) Chance (%) 
X 1 0 80 80 
2 15 75 90 
3 35 65 100 
4 40 55 95 
5 65 25 90 
6 75 20 95 
7 80 0 80 
y 1 0 90 90 
2 15 85 100 
3 30 65 95 
4 50 40 90 
5 75 20 95 
6 80 5 85 
7 90 0 90 
z 1 0 80 80 
2 5 75 80 
3 15 60 75 
4 25 55 80 
5 45 35 80 
6 75 25 100 
7 80 0 80 
NOTE: Joint chances to win (%) were not provided to subjects. 
Table 2 
Experimental Results 
Pa):off Division 
Controller Controller 
Joint Equal +/-lOX Earns Earns More 
Experiment lottery Schedule N MaKirrun Split +/-Sl Maxi nun Than Haximun Disagreement Other 
Ex Ante 
ASX Siflllle X 10 10 5 2 0 0 0 3 
ASY S irrpl e y 6 4 3 2 0 0 0 1 
ASZ Simple l 7 6 5 1 0 0 0 1 
AS All 23 20 13 5 0 0 0 5 
ACX COf'll'OUnd X 6 7 4 2 1 1 0 2 
ACY Cocrpound y 6 6 2 1 1 0 0 2 
ACZ Corrpound z 4 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 
AC All 18 16 8 4 3 1 0 2 
Total (A) ASt-AC 41 36 21 9 3 1 0 7 
Ex Post 
PSX Sirrple X 6 5 4 1 1 0 0 0 
PSY Sinple y 10 6 6 2 0 0 0 0 
PSZ Simple z 7 7 5 1 1 0 0 0 
PS All 23 20 17 4 2 0 0 0 
PCX COfff>Ound X 6 4 6 0 0 0 0 0 
PcY CO<TpOUnd y 6 7 6 2 0 0 0 0 
PCZ Compound z 4 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 
PC All 16 15 15 3 0 0 0 0 
Total (P) PS+PC 41 35 32 7 2 0 0 0 
Grand Total (A) + (P) 82 71 53 16 5 0 7 
Table 3 
Statistical Tests of Propositions 3 and 4 
Test 
Progosition P3 
Ex Ante vs. 
Ex Post Bargaining 
AS + 
Progosition P4 
Simple vs. 
Compound Lottery 
AS + 
Null 
Hypothesis 
AS = ps• 
AC = PC 
AC = PS + 
AS = AC 
PS = PC 
PS = AC + 
PC 
PC 
Chi-Square Test Statistic: 
Pareto Optimality Equal Split 
0. 025b 
0.000 
0.000 
0.010' 
0.001 
0.006 
0.103 
0.833 
0.928 
0.066 
0.017 
0.003 
• - AS-ex ante simple lottery, PS-ex post simple lottery, 
AC-ex ante compound lottery, PC-ex post compound lottery. 
b - We cannot reject the null hypothesis for Proposition PJ with 
a 90% confidence level 
' - We cannot reject the null hypothesis for Proposition P4 with 
a 90% confidence level 
NOTE - See S. Siegel (1956) for an explanation of all statistical 
terminology. 
